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is a first attempt in an ongoing nego-
tiation between “what is” – and the 
“regulating fictions” (Roy, 2009: 820) and 
fabrications that dictate what the future 
“must” and “can only be” – versus 
imagining empowering tomorrows 
based on the “what ifs …” of today 
(Haiven & Khasnabish, 2010: ix). Put 
plainly, the current dominant nostrums 
and prescriptions informing ‘sound’ 
statecraft – ‘good governance’, ‘failing 
and fragile states’, the ‘big’ or ‘new’ 
society’ agendas – deny admission 
and negotiation of developing country 
realities manifested in the un/making 
of institutions and social orders; the 
inordinate weight of culture, clientelism 
and patronage in social structures, 
politics and institutions, and the carrying 
forward of (unruly) rupture(s) into the 
postcolonial social order.
The recording and decoding of ‘facts’, 
events and history – and their transmit-
ted interpretations – are closely tied 
to serving power and its subsequent 
embedding in the consciousness of past 
and present generations. This ‘mental 
make-up’ – history teaches – is to a 
great degree about elite ‘perception’ 
(or prejudice) masquerading as the 
‘real’, which
... may be quite far removed 
from the reality of the past, but it 
is the reality of the present, and 
thus influences the response 
and groups of individuals ... 
None of this is to suggest that 
history is destiny. Policy makers 
do not have to be prisoners of 
the past, at least the past as 
embedded in the perceptions 
of the present generation. But 
they cannot ignore it either. 
At the very least they have to 
know what these perceptions 
are – this is just prudent descrip-
tion of the reality onto which 
the policy intervention will be 
implemented. But they must go 
further. If they are to overcome 
the weight of the past, they 
have to understand why the 
population and the polity have 
these perceptions of this or that 
policy. What was the process 
that led to their embedding … 
It is only with this knowledge, 
knowledge that only the 
Contemporary statecraft for sustained and 
‘sustainable’ growth
Firoz Khan
Peer reviewed and revised
Paper presented at the Planning Africa 2012 Congress
To walk questioningly and to make the road while walking1
Abstract
Focusing on state structure and behaviour, the ‘good governance’ agenda, political 
settlement, and the current path, this article describes and elaborates – in a problematic 
manner – the hurdles we will encounter in simultaneously walking and making the road 
of state construction that is messy, complex and replete with contradictions. Some 
implications for planning are outlined related to issues of governance and working with 
clientelism and patronage as enablers and contributors to growth rather than pathologies 
to be ‘corrected by administrative reforms’. Whether we can carry through and successfully 
deliver socially inclusive and empowering developmental programmes and projects hinges 
on understanding and negotiating social change and transformation.
HEDENDAAGSE STAATKUNDE VIR VOLGEHOUE EN ‘VOLHOUBARE’ GROEI
Met ’n fokus op die gedrag van die staat, die ‘goeie regering’ agenda, politieke skikking, 
en die huidige koers, beskryf hierdie artikel uitvoerig – en op ’n problematise wyse – die 
hindernisse wat ons sal teëkom terwyl ons meedoen aan die slordige, komplekse en 
teenstrydigdige proses van tersylfdertyd die pad van staatskonstruksie maak en bewandel. 
Etlike implikasies vir beplanning en met verwysing tot staatsbestuur, wat saamwerk met 
klientisme en begunstiging as bemagtigers en meewerkers tot groei, in plaas van ‘n patologie 
wat reggestel moet word deur adminiatratiewe hervorming, word geskets. Die deurvoer en 
suksesvolle lewering van sosiaal inklusiewe en bemagtigtende ontwikkelingsprogramme en 
projekte sal afhang van ons begrip van sosiale verandering en transformasie en hoe ons 
daarmee handel.
MEKHOA YA SEJOALE-JOALE E MMUSO E LEBELLANG HO E SEBEDISA HO 
ETSA TSWELOPELE E HOLE
Boitshoaro le mekhoa e mmuso e sebetsang ka teng, ntlheng ya ‘puso e nepahetseng’ 
(good governance); meaho ya dipolotiki le tsela e se ntse nkua ke mmuso ke se tlo shebua 
ka leihlo le hloahloa serapeng sena. Morero oa serapa sena ke ho hlalosa le ho hlalosisa 
ka tsela ea ho bontsa bothata. Mathata ao re tla kopana le ona a tla ba mangata a ba 
hanane. Tlhahiso tse ling tsa merero ea metse e meholo le detereke ke ho  amanya mmuso 
hore o sebetsane le sechaba hore se khone ho kenyelletsa seo ba khonang tabeng ea 
khuliso ea baka sa sona ntle le hore mmuso o se ke oa ba nkela hloohong ebe o bona 
dithlahiso tsa sechaba di hloka ho tshoaua. Ho atleha morerong oa ho phethahatsa 
dipheo tsa tswelopele tse nepahetseng, ho itswela ho kutloisiso le dipuisano le sechaba 
ka phetoho.  
1. INTRODUCTION
How does one redirect and transform the forces and vectors of an oppressive 
enduring present past and productively reconcile and align minority and majority 
aspirations? How does one ‘unfix’ the fixed elite images of countries and cities 
and sugar the alternative bitter pill for elite consumption? How does one achieve 
all of this amid crises in the material and ideational processes and structures of 
our world?
In full recognition of the fact that contemporary statecraft and the construction 
of a developmental state is a fuzzy, messy and unpredictable business, this article 
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disciplined study of history in its 
various facets (political, social, 
intellectual, cultural) can pro-
vide, that they can address the 
constraints, or the opportunities, 
that history presents to them 
for the policy question at hand 
(Kanbur, 2008: 4-5).
It is not possible, within the constraints 
of this article, to immerse oneself in 
an intensive deconstruction and/or 
disembedding exercise proposed by 
Kanbur. It is, for this reason, why this 
short contribution will be accused, 
and reasonably so, of peddling many 
simplistic nostrums of dubious merit. 
Risking this, the purpose of this article 
is to describe and elaborate – in a 
problematic manner – the hurdles to be 
encountered in simultaneously walking 
and making the road.
2. STATE STRUCTURE 
AND BEHAVIOUR
It is not controversial to posit that the 
culture of domination and control 
inheres in the economic and political 
institutions of many postcolonial states 
(see Umeh & Andranovich, 2005: 153). 
The reasons are numerous, but critical 
are “processes of mimicry and norma-
tive pressures” associated with “institu-
tional isomorphism”, whereby “organisa-
tions seek legitimacy by adopting what 
they understand to be the successful 
practices of other organisations, and 
therefore come to resemble each other 
over time” (Klug, 2000: 5). More point-
edly, they identify “mimetic, coercive 
and normative isomorphisms as different 
processes through which th[e] transfer 
of ideas, practices and understand-
ings take place” (Klug, 2000: 5) that in 
the long run postpone “decisions on 
sensitive and potentially unresolvable 
questions” (Klug, 2000: 18), thereby serv-
ing to pragmatically (opportunistically) 
delimit the terrain and field of politics, 
economy and statecraft. Predictably, 
with respect to the “structure and be-
haviour of the [modern] state” (Becker 
& Goldstone, 2005: 192), revolutionary 
leaders have come to realise that they 
“cannot merely wave a magic wand 
labelled ‘authority’ and create stable 
state institutions” (Becker & Goldstone, 
2005: 194). These have to be “crafted 
from resources at hand” (Becker & 
Goldstone, 2005: 193) and mindful of 
national and international contexts 
and pressures. But what are these 
resources, and how to simultaneously 
resist the temptations and seductions of 
isomorphism?
Discernible in the long march of history 
is that of all the major social revolutions 
(from France in 1789 to Nicaragua and 
Iran in 1979), “none except for France 
(1789) has yet produced a fully modern 
state with both high levels of infrastruc-
tural power and low levels of despotic 
power – and it took France well over a 
hundred years … to do so” (Becker & 
Goldstone, 2005: 208, original empha-
sis). Once again, reasons abound for 
this, including palace politics, the power 
and influence of old and emerging 
elites, the level of the country’s devel-
opment, and the external environment. 
But more telling is that consolidation 
of the modern state form (with refer-
ence, in this instance, to the European 
states) was a “development that took 
close to a millennium to play itself out” 
(Rueschemeyer, 2005: 144).
Globally, the evolution of state designs, 
and their diffusion and implementa-
tion, has been a “very slow process” 
(Becker & Goldstone, 2005: 206) and 
took centuries, commencing from 
the Gregorian reforms of the Catholic 
Church in the eleventh century and 
the “attendant revival of Roman law” 
(Rueschemeyer, 2005: 144). However, 
this model of hierarchical meritocratic 
bureaucracy and Roman canon law 
“remained confounded with continued 
patrimonial/aristocratic authority 
throughout Europe” until the early nine-
teenth century (Becker & Goldstone, 
2005: 206). Confounding matters further 
was the ascendancy of “church-trained 
administrators and their hierarchical 
bureaucratic vision of state structures 
in secular states” (Becker & Goldstone, 
2005: 206) accompanied by a “decline 
in the role of democratic or republican 
institutions that had developed from 
medieval city councils, provincial self-
governance, and the rulers’ counsel-
lors” (Becker & Goldstone, 2005: 207). 
From the suppression of the 
Comuneros in Spain, to the las-
situde of the French provincial 
Estates and Estates-General, to 
the Prussian suppression of the 
Estates in western Germany, 
to the efforts of Charles I 
and James II to rule without 
Parliament or subordinate it 
to royal will, the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries saw 
the spread of models of ‘en-
lightened absolutism’ as the 
ideal for efficient and rational 
governance ... [W]hile efforts 
to rebuild states along consti-
tutional lines spread throughout 
the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries … such efforts faced 
entrenched opposition from 
both landed and military elites 
… Thus by the 1950s, although 
the number of states operating 
as hereditary monarchies had 
dwindled to a handful, rela-
tively few states had built effec-
tive republican/democratic 
states. Instead the majority of 
world’s states were constructed 
as military or civilian dictator-
ships, or according to a new, 
twentieth-century design – the 
one-party state, in which a 
modern efficient hierarchical 
bureaucracy implemented the 
plans of an exclusive political 
elite organised as a ‘party’ 
or corporate body (Becker & 
Goldstone, 2005: 207).
To summarise, historical records reveal 
that building an effective state is 
an incremental and slow process. 
Demonstrated also is that because the 
old regimes (institutions and elites) pose 
the “greatest obstacles to revolutionary 
state building” (Becker & Goldstone, 
2005: 202), but simultaneously furnish the 
resources for state building, the 
… normative and institutional 
transformations in society and 
in state-society relations are ul-
timately far more important for 
effective action than overcom-
ing opposition to the develop-
ment of an effective state and 
the expansion of its scope and 
action (Rueschemeyer, 2005: 
153).
On the other hand, the pressures and 
strains of institutional isomorphism – 
“new/old” and “old/new” elites, the 
relative underdevelopment of the 
“material idea of the regstaat/just 
state” (Strauss, 2007; 63, original em-
phasis) (versus the secularisation of the 
biblical motives of freedom), and the 
authoritarian antecedents of old and 
new statecraft (Catholic Church hier-
archies/meritocracy and patrimonalism 
whipped together with varying dollops 
of republicanism and/or civilian/
military dictatorships and/or one-party 
states) – collectively shine the torch on 
why, both here and elsewhere, there 
is enormous continuity in discontinuity 
with respect to our inability to elaborate 
democratically responsive governance 
frameworks, (state) corporate coher-
ence and cohesive state-civil society 
relations.
Without the painting of this historical 
and cognitive canvas, is it any small 
wonder why we are hamstrung in 
explaining and rationalising effective 
developmental statecraft of the old 
and modern type, i.e. bad governance, 
authoritarianism, technocratic rule, 
centralisation of power, coercion, 
unsavoury (and often downright 
corrupt) relationships between public 
Khan • Contemporary statecraft for sustained and ‘sustainable’ growth
3
and private sector elites, rent-seeking, 
bad institutional design, ‘getting the 
prices wrong’, hybrid service delivery 
institutional production regimes, 
and so forth. Indeed, a multitude of 
cases explored by world-renowned 
sociologists, political scientists and 
economists consistently and repeatedly 
demonstrate that “the construction 
of the developmental state is a 
deliberate, messy and complex affair” 
(Noman & Stiglitz, 2012: 34) and that 
“if developmentalism of a progressive 
kind is not messy and conflict-ridden, 
it is probably not happening at all” 
(Mackintosh, 1993: 49).
Greater appreciation of the historical 
antecedents of contemporary state-
craft may assist in viewing “more 
macroscopically ... the ways in which 
the structures and activities of states 
unintentionally influence the formation 
of groups and the political capacities, 
ideas, and demands of various sectors 
of society” (Skocpol, 1985, cited in 
Lange & Rueschemeyer, 2005: 242). 
Hence, if the historical record shows 
that effective and “rapid post-revolu-
tionary state building requires [among 
others] … the removal of entrenched 
elites” (Lange & Rueschemeyer, 2005: 
252) or the regulation and/or redirec-
tion of capital and/or the restructuring 
of socio-economic power blocs, the 
dynamics of contemporary capitalism 
and the linked modalities of govern-
mentality present huge problems. With 
reference to the dynamics, the central 
components of the present restoration 
and reconstitution of ruling-class power 
resides in, among others, a re-energised 
strategy of “accumulation by [rapa-
cious] dispossession” (see Harvey, 2007: 
116), the maintenance and protection 
of asymmetric economic relations, 
and heterodox economic reflation 
strategies at the apex but imposition of 
orthodox austerity on the rest (a case 
of ‘do what we tell you to do and not 
[emulate] what we do!’). Uneven in 
scope and spread, this reconstitution 
and restoration is bolted together by 
state technologies and techniques that 
are extremely thin on democracy (‘low 
intensity’ democracy); insulates policies, 
politics and politicians from social 
pressure; lies  and deceives the citizenry, 
and centralises political (executive) 
power (see Leys, 2006). These technolo-
gies and techniques are the “neces-
sary” (not peripheral) “conditions of 
neoliberal democracy” (Leys, 2006: 3).
However, to simply close the book on 
the potential for transformative post-
revolutionary state [re-]construction 
by endless carping about historical 
constraints and internal and external 
pressures is to dismiss the “unintended 
consequences of state structures” 
(Lange & Rueschemeyer, 2005: 242) 
and state design. Paradoxically, the 
“removal of opposition and political 
control” of the subaltern in neoconserv-
ative/neoliberal constitutional democ-
racies and one-party “end of history” 
state formats does, in the longer term, 
“limit [their] effectiveness, stability [and] 
durability [as they lack the] reciprocity 
through which states are guided and 
disciplined” (Lange & Rueschemeyer, 
2005: 252-254).2 Thus, the more a ruling 
regime centralises power, erodes and 
undermines autonomous (sub-) authori-
ties, and “stifles civil society” (Lange & 
Rueschemeyer, 2005: 252), the “easier is 
yo build a powerful revolutionary state” 
(see Becker & Goldstone, 2005: 202) 
– and perhaps more controversially, 
alternative global futures.
3. ‘GOOD’, ‘GOOD ENOUGH’ 
AND ‘BAD’ GOVERNANCE: 
DILEMMAS AND DEBATES
Institutional design and crafting 
profoundly influence and impact 
the generation and distribution of 
“returns” to various segments and 
portions of society (see Evans, 2002: 
101-102). This, in turn, determines the 
pace and type of economic growth 
(rather than the other way around) (see 
Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2001; 
Kaufmann & Kraay, 2002; Kaufmann, 
Kraay & Mastruzzi, 2005). In retrospect, 
if the institution is the ‘goose’ and 
the economy the ‘egg’, the close 
relationship/affinity between the ‘good 
governance’ agenda – the institutional 
and political flipside of the Washington 
Consensus – and structural adjustment 
is eminently and inherently logical/
sensible.
The ‘good governance’ agenda – 
whose provenance derives from the 
1980s shift in the developed world from 
public administration to “new public 
management” (Turner & Hulme, 1997: 
230) – pivots on accountability, the rule 
of law, predictability and stability for 
the private sector, and transparency 
(equated to sound development 
management). Drawing inspiration 
from the minimalist state, private 
sector management techniques and 
non-market distorting market-incentive 
regimes, this governance orientation 
signals the 
… emergence of a kind of 
‘economic constitutionalism’[3] 
which endeavours to place 
certain market regulatory insti-
tutions [such as central banks4, 
competition commissions and 
state auditing watchdogs] be-
yond the reach of transitory po-
litical majorities or the actions of 
the political executive through 
mechanisms that provide for a 
high degree of autonomy for 
these institutions (Jayasuriya, 
2001: 110).
Economic constitutionalism (arguably 
both consubstantial and/or constitu-
tive of ‘good governance’) and the 
other strictures of ‘good governance’ 
(plus representative democracy) – a 
clean and efficient bureaucracy and 
judiciary; protection of property rights, 
contracts and patents; good corporate 
governance institutions; an independ-
ent central bank; and so on – now 
deemed as necessary conditions for 
development and imposed on develop-
ing countries – were the outcome rather 
than the cause of economic develop-
ment in the now-developed countries 
(Chang, 2002). Chang (2002) empirically 
demonstrates that until 1913 – and even 
beyond – universal suffrage and secret 
balloting in many of today’s developed 
countries was a novelty; there was 
widespread nepotism and corruption 
in the public sector; corporate govern-
ance institutions fell miserably short of 
modern standards; competition law 
was non-existent; banking regulation 
was underdeveloped or patchy; insider 
trading and stock price manipulation 
2 It is worth a reminder, in this instance, that governance is a product of interactions between state and non-state actors. This interaction produces 
political compromises on how a country and its resources are mobilised, distributed and managed on a collective basis (see Bhargava, 2011).
3 Economic constitutionalism treats the market as a “constitutional order with its own rules, procedures and institutions that operate to protect the 
market order from political interference” (Jayasuriya, 2001: 121).
4 An independent central bank rips the heart out of the development state through removing the power and capacity of “central economic 
agencies” to direct the kind of industrial policies that were a marked feature of these states. The shift of power away from technocratic economic 
agencies to independent central banks effectively erodes the close political relationship or bargaining between state and business that informed 
the operations of core state developmental agencies (Jayasuriya, 2001: 188).
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was common; income tax was not even 
in its infancy; labour legislation regard-
ing working hours, occupational safety, 
child and female labour standards were 
low, coverage limited and enforcement 
poor. Worded differently, the current 
demand that developing countries 
should (immediately) adopt world-class 
institutions or face punishment is at 
odds with historical experience of the 
developed countries. More intriguing is 
Chang’s (2002) finding that developed 
countries were institutionally much 
less advanced in those times than the 
currently developing countries at similar 
stages of development.5 Paradoxically 
then, it might be said that today’s 
under-developed countries of the 
world are, perhaps, institutionally over-
developed. The maintenance of this 
‘over-developed’ institutional infrastruc-
ture may be responsible for diverting 
scarce resources away from desper-
ately needed investment in poverty 
eradication and human development, 
harmful to equitable development, and 
contributing to their enslavement to the 
powerful of this world.
One could continue with these com-
parisons, but suffice it to say that in their 
early days of economic development, 
the now developed countries oper-
ated with crude and unsophisticated 
institutional structures versus those in 
today’s developing countries at com-
parable levels of development. Their 
democratic credentials referenced 
to representative democracy and 
‘good governance’ (especially state-
business relations) were also extremely 
suspect and unsavoury. In the so-called 
developmental states of East Asia, for 
example, a significant component 
of their success resided in a unique 
combination of close government ties 
with business, clientelism and bureau-
cratic insulation – termed ‘embedded 
autonomy’6 in the literature. Similar 
practices in Africa are slated as ‘state 
capture’, corruption and patronage 
– fundamentally at odds with World 
Bank notions of ‘good governance’ 
(Mkandawire, 2001). 
Stein (2000: 9) states that it is “doubtful” 
whether accountability, transparency 
and the rule of law will produce vibrant 
economies in the developing world. This 
follows “the general neoclassical notion 
of institutional neutrality … that will 
permit an unimpeded space for optimal 
private decision making”.
In the developmental states, rents 
created and allocated by the state 
– wherein higher than expected 
profits are provided to the private 
sector in return for investment and 
production in economically targeted 
activities – played a crucial role in the 
development of a capitalist class and 
robust accumulation. In the words of 
Amsden (1997: 469), the development 
of dynamic productive capacity and 
processes entailed the deliberate 
creation of “distortions” in the form of 
firm-specific skills, knowledge-based mo-
nopolies and other types of entry barri-
ers. Government’s role revolved around 
“joining” with the private sector to 
“socially construct competitive assets” 
(resources, capabilities and organisa-
tions) versus creating “perfect” markets.
To construct socially those com-
petitive assets for production 
purposes, governments have 
rigged key exchange prices, 
such as the price of foreign 
currency, credit, and labour 
(by weakening its bargain-
ing power); that is they have 
deliberately got relative prices 
wrong (Amsden, 1997: 471).
Accordingly, the system of contingent 
rents in the developmental states was 
effective on account of them being 
extended in response to activities 
deemed to serve the national interest; 
rent-seeking costs (information collec-
tion, influence peddling and bargain-
ing) were kept low; governments closed 
off non-productive avenues for wealth 
accumulation such as real-estate 
speculation (critical to the success of 
many housing programmes alongside 
the successful capture of increments 
in urban land development/develop-
ment gains); rents were provided on 
a selective and temporary basis and 
withdrawn as new industries matured 
enough to compete globally, and 
strict performance standards were 
enforced (Akuyz, 1996, cited in Stein, 
2000: 18). (This is a far cry from many of 
the present-day supply-side industrial 
incentive schemes and regimes). The 
point of the Asian experience, remarks 
Mkandawire (1998: 13) 
… is that the use of ‘rent seek-
ing’ as an argument against a 
more active developmental 
state is simply not credible. The 
relevant issues are ‘rents’ for 
whom and with what recipro-
cal obligations for receivers of 
rents? And the answer lies in 
the desired income distribu-
tion and strategy of develop-
ment. The denial of an active 
developmental state for fear 
of ‘capture’ is tantamount to 
the denial of the possibilities in 
Africa of accelerated develop-
ment achieved by a deliberate 
‘government of the market’ to-
wards greater mobilisation and 
developmental allocation of re-
sources (including rents). In the 
African debates, the fear of the 
damaging effects of rent seek-
ing has not only sustained the 
argument for a minimalist state, 
but has also given the foreign 
experts, who for inexplicable 
reasons do not engage in rent 
seeking like all other mortal be-
ings, a moral upper hand.
If case studies demonstrate that the 
‘good governance’ agenda “fatally 
damages the possibility of creating 
[and sustaining] a developmental 
transformation state” (Khan, 2004: 188), 
it has to battle with the contemporary 
status quo-oriented regimes of know-
ledge production that elevates model-
ling, mathematisation and high-order 
generalisations (see Buroway, 2005). 
Undergirded by an ‘epistemology of 
certainty’, the conservatives push and 
underwrite an economy of knowledge 
that “speaks closure, recognis-
able answers, simple conclusions 
and certainties” (see Shepherd, 2010: 
online). Cause and effect relation-
ships are often confused, and neat 
correlations, despite evidence to the 
contrary, are posited between growth 
and equality; redistribution and growth; 
democracy and growth; corruption 
and poor growth; regime type and 
growth; governance and poverty al-
leviation; decentralisation and poverty-
eradication. These become enshrined 
5 The now developed countries had relatively low levels of institutional development compared to the developing countries of today at comparable 
levels of development (especially per capita income). For instance, the United Kingdom of 1820 had only a slightly higher income than today’s India, 
but the latter has universal suffrage (the UK did not, even at that time, have universal male suffrage), a central bank, income tax, bankruptcy laws, 
a professional bureaucracy, and labour legislation (see Chang, 2002).
6 Embedded autonomy arises from the fusion of seemingly contradictory characteristics.
 Embeddedness provides sources of intelligence and channels of implementation that enhance the competence of the state. Autonomy 
complements embeddedness, protecting the state from piecemeal capture which would destroy the cohesiveness of the state itself and eventually 
undermine the coherence of its social interlocutors. The state’s corporate coherence enhances the cohesiveness of external networks and helps 
groups that share its vision overcoming their own collective action problems (Evans, 1995: 248).
Khan • Contemporary statecraft for sustained and ‘sustainable’ growth
5
in a plethora of indicators and indices, 
which strive to measure many things in 
a single moment, but are incapable of 
telling the whole story (Sanin-Gutierrez, 
Buitrago & Gonzalez, 2013).
Discovering how policies influ-
ence behaviour and hence 
aggregate outcomes, explor-
ing the conditions under which 
some reforms are most likely to 
give good results, and identify-
ing effective ways to improve 
development outcomes require 
an understanding of the pro-
cesses within which countries 
instrument policies, that is, their 
policymaking processes. It is 
essential that the policy process 
and the political process more 
broadly facilitate the agree-
ment, design, and implementa-
tion of effective long-term poli-
cies (Tommasi, 2011: 199).
The imposition of “burdensome lists 
of ‘things that must be done’ before 
development” can proceed (Grindle, 
2011: 205) produces an inordinate 
amount of white noise, detracting 
from approaches to governance 
and corruption reforms linked to 
development outcomes and the 
processes, agents and drivers of these. 
The question then becomes: What 
determines the ability of different 
societies to produce and implement 
effective policies? The answer is 
found in the distribution of power 
between contending social groups 
and social classes, on which any state 
is established and built, namely the 
political settlement.
4. POLITICAL SETTLEMENT: ELITES, 
POLITICAL PARTIES AND 
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
Looking at political settlement 
focuses attention on intra-elite 
contention and bargaining 
(political versus economic 
elites, landed and non-
landed elites, rural and urban, 
religious and secular, etc.), on 
contention and bargaining 
between elites and non-elites 
(either within groups or across 
them, as between classes), 
inter-group contention and 
bargaining (gender, regional, 
ethnic/linguistic, religious) and 
on contention and bargaining 
between those who occupy the 
state and society more widely 
(Di John & Putzel, 2009: 4).
At the risk of over-generalising from 
the South African experience, the 
accumulation strategies of many 
African states – the mineral-rich ones, in 
particular – is based on an intertwining 
of state-orchestrated “outside in” 
(industrialisation by invitation) and 
state-facilitated conglomerate “inside 
out” globalisation (neoconservative 
adjustment strategies) (Carmody, 
2002: 266). This gives rise to states 
that are embedded in global forces 
and negatively connected to 
(negative autonomy from) domestic 
social forces. Transnational capitalist 
business embeddedness, together 
with neoconservative dispositifs – 
self-styled doctrinaire abstractions 
of ‘economic pragmatism’, ‘sound 
fundamentals’, ‘investor confidence’, 
‘macroeconomic balance’, and ‘good 
governance’ – often put paid to any 
drastic interference in property rights, 
financial markets and the socio-political 
distribution of power.
Secondly, as the state liberalises the 
economy to maintain the ‘confidence’ 
of international investors and uses the 
global market forces to discipline pro-
ductive capital and labour, it undercuts 
the social foundations of a project of 
developmental state construction and 
intervention, i.e. the nurturing of a social 
class and domestic alliances with an 
interest in state building and vested with 
sufficient political power to undertake 
it. On the one hand, the sections 
of society (working class, informal 
economy and rural poor) with whom 
the state needs to align themselves for 
the purposes of building an assertive 
state have very little or nothing to gain 
from the exclusionary economic growth 
path and distribution patterns. On the 
other hand, there is little reason for the 
privileged to support efforts seeking to 
establish a strong redistributive state 
(Eriksen, 2005: 407).
Thirdly, with the elevation of supply-
sided infrastructure and service-delivery 
regimes versus coproduction – exhibited 
in the design and execution of 
technocratic and authoritarian 
development policies, programmes and 
projects for the poor – and the ‘exit’ 
strategies of the elite (recalling, in this 
instance, Albert Hirschman’s famous 
tract on loyalty and exit) – the social 
distance between state and society, 
and rich and poor, function in ways 
to further entrench and solidify the 
fault lines of class, race, gender and 
exclusion. Atop all this is the party that 
deploys an arsenal of techniques and 
technologies of liberal governmentality 
that obliterates the public realm and 
accountability of the elite.8
Fourthly, at some distance from 
countries whose historical development 
evolution revolves on markets and 
capital accumulation regulated by 
bureaucracies in the national interest, 
those with enduring pre-industrial 
agricultural economic foundations 
and classless/egalitarian-type ethnic/
kinship institutions present unique state 
construction and statecraft challenges. 
Politics in numerous North and Middle 
African countries is “personalised 
and based on coalitions of informal 
‘patron-client’ political organisations, 
using organisational power to allocate 
rents” (Khan, 2011: 2). The imposition 
of colonial models of development, 
and their intermingling with these 
foundations and institutions generates 
complex and complicated patterns of 
conflict, competition and co-operation 
not easily contained in the shallow, 
institutionally monocropping tracts and 
strictures of ‘good governance’.
It is not surprising that many productive 
articulations and hybridisations 
have occurred between colonial/
liberal and pre-colonial associational 
and moral economies (Khan, 2011) 
based on treating “informality” not as 
“pathology”, in other words, inimical 
to good governance and/or to be 
“corrected by administrative reforms” 
(Khan, 2011: 11). Under these conditions 
and circumstances, administrative 
efforts to render African governments 
more transparent often work against the 
grain of their societal patterns/practices 
of legitimacy, accountability, power 
and obligation, and are likely to have 
“limited success” (Kelsall, 2011: 232). 
Differently worded, the programmatic 
push to enhance transparency denies 
the reality that these practices/patterns
... must remain opaque be-
cause they are both necessary 
and illegal: necessary because 
politicians for reasons of tradi-
tional legitimacy must deliver 
8 These include the professionalisation and/or the collapsing of party into state structures; the diminished influence over public policies and governing 
processes of the wider public and the increased use of special advisers with direct relationships to the highest offices of land; insulation and 
centralisation of decision-making at executive levels of state (especially central); the corresponding downgrading and displacement of the legislature 
and executive oversight; greater ministerial discretion and control over the formulation and implementation of official development interventions via 
the supplementing/replacement of cabinet-endorsed ‘policy’ by (secretive and/or restrictively circulated) ‘frameworks’/’strategies’ (Khan, 2010).
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resources through personalised 
clientelistic networks, and illegal 
because they contravene an 
imported ideological, legal and 
governmental system founded 
on a strong separation be-
tween public and private that 
has never existed in Africa ... 
The lack of the fit between local 
culture and imported institutions 
consequently creates incen-
tives for rule-breaking and op-
portunities for self-enrichment. 
What is more, the formal institu-
tions of the state are working 
against the grain of society’s 
more dynamic forces. At best, 
this may hold unmanageable 
centrifuges in check, but, more 
normally it puts a brake on soci-
ety’s energies, channels politics 
and administration into opac-
ity and unpredictability, and 
makes trust impossible to attain 
(Kelsall, 2011: 232-233).
So what might working with the grain 
of viable governing and governance 
regimes entail? Drawing from the work 
of researchers connected to the Africa 
Power and Politics Programme,9 this in-
cludes refraining from imposing external 
behavioural models; complementing 
local understandings of power, author-
ity and organisational modes; respect-
ing traditional norms for selecting local 
leaders; harnessing the authority of local 
leaders that command/wield legiti-
macy and ‘fitting institutions to realities 
of political legitimacy’ at ground level. 
Acknowledging corruption and working 
with neo-patrimonialism and the politi-
cal context, in which it is rooted and 
functions, requires an in-depth under-
standing of the multitude organisations 
and the functioning of clientelism and, 
most critically, their role (albeit not 
always) as enabler and contributor to 
‘sustained’ and ’sustainable’ economic 
growth and development.
5. THE CURRENT PATH
The ‘End of History’ triumphalism – culmi-
nating in the financial crisis of 2008/2009 
– marked a significant turning point in 
the rethinking and remaking of national 
and global political economies. There 
is now widespread agreement, even 
in conservative circles, that the events 
of 2008/2009 herald an end to the 
“market state” or an end to a “market 
fundamentalism [that] abandoned the 
fundamentals of the market” (Blond, 
n.d.: 1, 3). Slowly and steadily replacing 
it is a “more balanced account of state 
versus market, global integration, and 
fiscal and monetary strategies” (Kanbur, 
2009: 6). The post-crisis market re-em-
bedding exercises and strategies, espe-
cially in the Americas and Europe, alert 
us to alternative/different pathways 
to economic development that were 
dismissed and vilified for a long time. 
Buttressing this are the success stories of 
India and China, who bucked the eco-
nomic orthodoxies of the Anglo-Saxon 
growth model, and the post-structural 
adjustment stratagems of centre-left 
Latin American governments with their 
eclectic mix of orthodox and heterodox 
pro-growth (versus pro-market) interven-
tions. Amazing about these newish and 
on-going policy reform initiatives are 
the diversities of the balances struck 
between state and economy, state 
and society, and national and global 
interests. In a context of a crisis of ideas, 
there have been democratic renewals 
in countries that one never thought 
possible, and innumerable – though 
dispersed and incoherent – radical 
development experiments in the poor 
slums, shantytowns and townships of the 
world, alongside the protests and rebel-
lions “everywhere” else (The Economist, 
2013b: 56).
The prospects and potentials afforded 
us by this conjuncture to remake the 
‘development’ project, re-engineer 
governance regimes, and (re)-activate 
(a high-intensity) democracy impels 
us to open the eyes of our mind. 
Unlike the past, however, this type of 
political engagement is less about 
climbing or scaling the emancipatory 
peaks of the imaginaries of the new 
age-development thinkers. Politics, in 
this frame, is “not an event that hap-
pens once, a spectacular outburst of 
energy that overcomes the dark forces 
of oppression and lifts liberation into 
a superior state of perpetual triumph” 
(Farhi, 2003: 39). This politics is the “act 
of climbing, daily, tenaciously and 
incessantly” (Farhi, 2003: 39), advancing 
each day by a “millimetre, in the right 
direction” (late President Hugo Chávez 
of Venezuela, 2004, cited in Swilling, 
Van Breda, Van Zyl & Khan, 2005: 1), 
and “centimetre” to “simply do what 
needs to be done” (ex-President Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil, cited in 
Bearak, 2004: 3). It is important to bear 
in mind though that less significant in all 
these many contexts are the forms of 
(or the follies and foolishness of) brush-
ing against the grain. More critically, “[i]
t is hoped that the search for answers 
will yield insights into the problematic of 
African development never considered 
before” (Kelsall, 2011: 245) or, to state 
it more forcefully, never permitted 
consideration by those in the develop-
ment and academic community, who 
have for so long outlawed the political 
adultery, institutional promiscuity and 
institutional trespass/hybridisation 
that are both implicit and explicit in 
these (historically proven successful) 
unorthodox governance orientations 
and pathways.
With this uppermost in our minds, the 
questions before us are:
• For how long are we going to allow 
narcissistic, snake-oil salesmen to 
pedal their hope-stripping orthodox 
state reform and statecraft medi-
cine that kills ‘the patient’? 
• For how long will we permit these 
charlatans, who are in the pay 
of the rich and powerful, and not 
ignorant of oppressive design, to 
continue administration of their 
vile and toxic medicine, which 
prematurely extinguishes (even) the 
possibility of installing and nurturing 
‘sustained’ and ‘sustainable’ growth 
and development?
• For how long are we going to allow 
the neocons to continue to build 
a road on which we un/question-
ingly walk in the knowledge that it 
is a highway to lifelong misery and 
purgatory?
Recent uprisings and protests in 
societies ruled by democratic and 
undemocratic regimes (including those 
in the grip of economic crises and harsh 
austerity programmes) – Egypt, Tunisia, 
Spain, Greece and Brazil – might offer 
some clues to these questions. Many 
would no doubt contest the rebellions 
and revolts relaying clues as they are 
ideologically undefined and without 
clear strategies. Without doubt though 
is the message relayed to governors 
the world over: “[P]oliticians who want 
to peddle the same old stuff, the news 
is not good” (The Economist, 2013a: 
34-35). This is because they originate 
in the unprecedented and profound 
degeneration of the core ‘institutions’ of 
our modern societies/‘key components 
of our civilisation’: representative 
government, the free market, the rule of 
law and civil society (see, for example, 
Ferguson, 2012; Harvey, 2012). What 
is distinctive about the protests is that 
“their organisers saw themselves as 
being part of the same global upsurge”.
9 A consortium research programme, supported by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and Irish Aid, for the benefit of developing 
countries. Richard Crook, David Booth and Goran Hyden are some of the luminaries associated with this project.
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Placards in Madison paid hom-
age to Tahrir Square and the 
activists in Occupy Wall Street 
took inspiration from Madison. 
What stood out the most was 
that, for the first time since 
the 1980s, social movements 
put the question of capitalism 
back on the political agenda 
(Panitch, Albo & Chibber, 2012: 
ix, original emphasis).
In Brazil, the scene of the most recent 
uprising, protestors took to the streets 
not only to express their dissatisfac-
tion about education, health and 
transportation. Their outrage – including 
the hurling of Molotov cocktails at 
government offices – was directed at 
the skewed distribution of benefits from 
growth, a political system that favours 
the “powerful few” at the “expense 
of the many”, and “politicians who 
act legally on behalf of the powerful” 
(Teixiera & Baiocchi, 2013: online, 
emphasis added).
The degeneration of the core institutions 
of civilisation, the placing of ‘capitalism’ 
back on the agenda, revolts against 
the uneven distribution of resources 
(in New York, Brazil and South Africa), 
and the rejection of politicians and 
political systems that legally exclude the 
majority, should, at minimum, unsettle 
the narcissistic neocon charlatans 
or, at best, behead or depose them. 
Either way, the news of their fate will be 
welcome! We hope and pray that they 
are rewarded with a fate they richly 
deserve: damned to Hell!
6. CONCLUSION
This article is a modest contribution to 
growing scholarship registering pro-
found disillusionment with the content 
and practical interventions of both 
aspirant and aspiring contemporary 
(transformative) state construction. 
There is no doubt that state construction 
is messy, complex and replete with 
contradictions. Disturbing though is 
how the technologies and strategies 
championed and advocated by those 
of mainstream orientations and schools 
come to be unquestioningly appropri-
ated by ruling elites (worldwide) in spite 
of the overwhelming evidence of the 
damages and devastations wrought 
on institutions and societies, i.e. the 
agenda is out of kilter with reducing 
poverty, inequality and unemployment. 
Indeed, research shows that a great 
many of the orthodox stratagems, by 
omission and commission, design and 
default, frequently reduce the capacity 
and capabilities of the state to ‘inter-
vene’ so as to further the demands and 
priorities associated with the popular 
will. This article points to the need for 
us to work with the ‘grain of African 
societies’, which is of quintessential 
importance, given the limited resources, 
money, time, knowledge, and human 
and organisational capacities that we 
have at our disposal. There is an urgent 
need to begin searching for innovative 
ways to move towards better govern-
ance grounded in a critical analysis of 
our context, paying particular attention 
to the balance of social forces and 
the strength and agility of forces within 
and outside the state, and cobbling 
political settlements that manage the 
tensions between short-term losses and 
long-term gain; that is, containing social 
fallout from the inevitable winner-
loser policy impact calculus. New and 
interesting vistas connected to pro-poor 
transformative statecraft are daily 
being prised open in other countries 
from which all of us can learn. A great 
many of them are anchored in historical 
record, democratic experimentation 
and ‘less-than-heroic’ versions of effect-
ing and sustaining social and economic 
change/transformation.
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